Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

State of Utah v. Eddie Michael Underwood: Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert L. Froerer; attorney for appellant.
David L. Wilkinson; attorney general; Sandra L. Sjogren; assistant attorney general; attorneys for
respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Eddie Michael Underwood, No. 860044.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/717

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

DEuEF

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

9^00^4

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 860044

-vEDDIE MICHAEL UNDERWOOD,

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER,
A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-203 (1978), IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE RONALD 0. HYDE, JUDGE,
PRESIDING.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
SANDRA L. SJOGREN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

ROBERT L. FROERER
Public Defender Assoc.
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Appellant

MAR 131987
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

-v-

:

EDDIE MICHAEL UNDERWOOD,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 860044

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER,
A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-203 (1978), IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE RONALD 0. HYDE, JUDGE,
PRESIDING.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
SANDRA L. SJOGREN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

ROBERT L. FROERER
Public Defender Assoc.
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

i

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

... 1
5

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILTY OF SECOND
DEGREE MURDER

CONCLUSION

5
10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701 (Utah 1985)

6

State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985)

10

State v.

8

Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984)

State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980)

8

State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985)

8

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (1978)

1, 6

Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-402 (1978)

7, 8

ii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

Case No. 860044

EDDIE MICHAEL UNDERWOOD,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant, i
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Eddie Michael Underwood, was charged with
Second Degree Murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (1978).
Defendant was convicted of Second Degree Murder, in a
jury trial held December 11, 12, 16, 17, and 18, 1985, in the
Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, presiding.

Defendant

was sentenced by Judge Hyde on December 20, 1985 to five years to
life in the Utah State Penitentiary.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 7, 1985 at about 4:00 p.m. the 16 year old
victim Leon Zerfas, left home on his way to work (T. 311-312).
At about the same time the defendant Eddie Underwood, his mother
Cleo Underwood, and his sister Dolly Underwood, left Liberty Park
in Ogden to return to their home at 2268 Jefferson Street.

By

chance defendant and Leon met as defendant was leaving the park.
Defendant saw Leon across the street talking with a girl (T.
1024).

Leon observed the defendant at about the same time and

began shouting at defendant (T. 617, 700). Leon crossed the

street and approached defendant (T. 620, 703, 1026) shouting
obscenities and challenging defendant to a fist fight (T. 1027).
Defendant and Leon knew each other because Defendant
had been involved in an intimate relationship with Leon's mother
(T. 843-844) which came to an end in July, 1985 when defendant
was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of Leon's six-year-old
sister (T. 1014-1015).

While charges were pending, defendant had

Deen ordered to stay away from the family (T. 725, 855, 867,
1040) .
At trial, defendant testified that when he saw Leon on
that street corner he wanted to get away because he had heard
that Leon was out to get him (T. 1021-1022) and he was afraid.
However, further testimony by defendant contradicts this. Leon
had made no attempt to harm defendant in the seven weeks since
the molestation charges were brought (T. 1040).

Also, defendant

had continued to visit a girlfriend that lived next door to Leon
and his family (T. 1046).
As Leon approached defendant on the afternoon of
September 7, the loud voices attracted the attention of three
people in a car parked at the curb in front of 2234 Jefferson
Street (T. 148). The weather on that day was mild and the
windows of the car were rolled down allowing the witnesses to
hear the argument between Leon and the defendant (T. 153). The
two were on the sidewalk north of the car, approximately 2220
Jefferson Street (T. 150, 427, 515). Defendant's mother and
sister were several steps behind (T. 151).
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Upon becoming aware of defendant and the victim, the
witnesses observed that defendant had a knife in his hand (T.
151, 428-429, 516) and that Leon was not carrying anything (T.
153, 521-522)•

Leon and defendant continued arguing as they

moved down the sidewalk but according to the State's witnesses
Leon made no attempt to physically attack defendant (T. 154, 429,
520) although defendant testified that Leon was "punching,
prodding " (T. 1051-1052) as they moved down the stret.
As defendant and Leon drew closer to the parked car the
witnesses heard Leon say "Asshole, letfs fight" and "you molested
my sister" (T. 160, 427, 617, 1027).

When Leon noticed that

defendant had pulled out the knife, he said "Why don't you put
the knife down and fight me like a man" (T. 159, 433, 521). One
witness heard Leon make this request three times (T. 159).
Defendant admitted at trial that Leon requested him to put down
the knife at least three times (T 1090).

Defendant did not

respond to Leon's requests.
As Leon and the defendant reached a point just in front
of the car where the witnesses were seated, Leon saw a pipe lying
near the curb.

Leon crossed in front of defendant and walked

over to pick up the pipe (T. 1653, 522). Defendant made no
attempt to stop Leon but defendant testified that he reacted to
Leon's movement in front of him by raising the knife from the
position at his side (T. 1030).
Defendant continued a short distance further down the
sidewalk then stopped and turned to face Leon (T. 167, 435, 523);
defendant made no attempt to leave the scene nor did he tell Leon
to put down the pipe and go home.
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Leon returned to the sidewalk holding the pipe in front
of himself in a defensive manner, making no attempt to swing at
defendant (T. 175, 227, 437, 530). As Leon took a step forward,
defendant moved toward Leon, grabbed the pipe, pulled Leon
forward and stabbed him (T. 174, 228, 437-38, 529). At trial,
defendant claimed that Leon was swinging and flailing the pipe so
that defendant had no alternative to the action he took
"That's it, it's him or me."

—

(T. 1033).

After the stabbing, defendant turned to the bystanders
and stated that they were all witnesses to self-defense (T. 176,
237, 1076), then wiped off the knife (T. 181, 235, 271, 442, 655656, 1070) and told his mother to hide it (T. 715, 1071).
Death was almost immediate for Leon Zerfas.

Dr. Edwin

S. Sweeney, State Medical Examiner, testified that Leon died from
a stab wound to the chest (T. 278) which punctured the heart,
causing fatal internal hemorrhage (T. 279). Dr. Sweeney stated
that the wound was "very serious and likely to be fatal no matter
what" (T. 279-280).

Leon died within a minute or so after he was

stabbed (T. 279).
When questioned by police at the scene, defendant
denied that he had been injured (T. 365). When later booked into
jail defendant was asked specifically if he had been hit and
replied: not that he knew of (T. 569). Detective Shane Minor
then pointed out a small abrasion on defendant's upper arm.
Detective Minor testified that defendant laughed and said,
•That's going to be better for me, that's real good" (T. 569).
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On December 18, 1985 the jury returned a verdict of
guilty of second degree murder.

Defendant now appeals that

conviction.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence presented below, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict, supports defendant's
conviction of second degree murder.

Witnesses contradicted

defendant's claim of self defense with evidence that the victim's
threats were verbal and that defendant escalated the altercation
by brandishing a knife.

The jury was free to conclude that the

victim was merely protecting himself when he picked up a pipe
lying nearby and held it in front of his body without swinging it
at defendant.

There was no gap in the State's evidence nor was

the jury obligated to accept defendant's account of the fight.
Thus, reasonable minds could have concluded, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that defendant was guilty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILTY OF SECOND DEGREE
MURDER
Defendant claims that the evidence presented against
him at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict.
Specifically, defendant asserts that the State failed to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted under
circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life.
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction this Court has applied a strict
standard of review:
•5-

This Court will not lightly overturn a jury
verdict. When there is any evidence,
including reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from it, from which findings of all the
requisite elements of the crime can be
reasonably made, our inquiry stops and we
sustain the verdict.
State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985).

Although

defendant's testimony contradicted the State's evidence, that in
itself is not grounds for reversal.

State v. Buehl> 700 P.2d 701

(Utah 1985).
It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses, and it is not
within the prerogative of this Court to
substitute its judgment for that of the
factfinder.
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980).
At trial, and on appeal, defendant argues that he acted
in self defense, that the evidence as presented at trial was
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind that
defendant acted with the depraved indifference necessary to
convict him of second degree murder.

According to Utah Code Ann.

S 76-5-203(1) (c) one may be convicted of second degree murder
when "acting under circum-stances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life, he engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of
another."
This Court, in State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah
1984), set forth four elements the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt before a jury may properly convict one of second
degree murder under the depraved indifference standard.
are:
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They

1. The defendant engaged in conduct that
created a grave risk of death to another; and
2. At the time he so acted, the defendant
knew that his conduct created a grave risk of
death to another; and
3. The circumstances under which the
defendant acted, objectively viewed by a ,
reasonable roan rather than subjectively by
the actual state of defendants mind, were
such as to evidence a depraved indifference
to human life; and
4. The defendant thereby unlawfully caused
the death of another.
Id. at 1047.

Defendant admitted that he engaged in conduct that

not only created a grave risk of death to another but did cause
death to occur.

However, defendant argues that his conduct was

reasonable as an act of self-defense.

According to Utah Code

Ann. S 76-2-402 (1953) a person is justified in using force which
is "intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury
only if he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to
prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third
person, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony."
Section 76-2-402 further states:
A person will not be justified in using force
when he:
a) Initially provokes the use of force
against himself with the intent to use force
as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the
assailant; or
c) Was the aggressor or was engaged in a
combat by agreement, unless he withdraws from
the encounter and effectively communicates to
such other person his intent to do so and the
other notwithstanding continues or threatens
to continue the use of unlawful force.
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Since the use of force requires a reasonable belief
that such force is necessary, defendant did not establish that he
acted in self defense.

Defendant testified that he believed his

life to be in danger, that the victim was "flailing" the pipe
around trying to hit defendant and that he determined that he
•could no longer fend him off," finally deciding, "That's it; now
it's him or me" (T. 1033).

This testimony is contrary to the

testimony of at least four witnesses who indicated that
defendant's fear of the victim was not a reasonable belief.
According to these witnesses the victim never swung the pipe at
defendant (T. 175, 227, 437, 530). Although the victim verbally
abused defendant and challenged him to a fist fight prior to
picking up the pipe, there is testimony indicating that the
victim never hit the defendant, or in any way attempted to
physically hurt him.

There is substantial testimony to indicate

that Leon picked up the pipe in order to protect himself, not to
use it as a weapon.
Even though defendant argues that he reasonably
believed his life to be in danger, defendant's use of deadly
force would be prohibited by the exceptions listed in § 76-2402(2).

First, one who provokes the use of force against himself

may not later claim

self-defense.

Although there is

contradictory testimony concerning whether or not force was used
against defendant, such force (if used) was provoked by defendant
when he pulled out the knife.

Up to that point, Leon's attack

was strictly verbal, there was no threat of imminent deadly force
(which defendant admitted at trial (T. 1053)).

-8-

Yet, defendant

claims that the verbal assault of a 16 year old boy caused
"substantial fear" and justified the escalation of the
altercation by pulling the knife.
Second, an aggressor, or one who engages in combat by
agreement, may not later claim that his actions were in selfdefense*

When defendant pulled out the knife he became the

aggressor.

He moved the turbulence from the level of a

challenged fist fight to an encounter with a deadly weapon.
Defendant's actions also indicate a willingness to engage in
combat.

Defendant made no attempt to prevent the clash.

He

never suggested that Leon go home; nor did he verbally refuse the
challenge to fight.

Defendant made no attempt to leave the scene

but chose to stop and wait when Leon moved off the sidewalk to
pick up the pipe.

Instead of continuing down the block to his

home at 2268 Jefferson Street, a few houses away, the defendant
chose to remain on the sidewalk at 2234 Jefferson Street and
fight.
Although defendant did not provoke Leon f s verbal
attack, defendant became the aggressor when he pulled out the
knife.

Further, defendants actions imply an agreement to engage

in an altercation.

Defendant made no attempt to leave the scene,

or to prevent physical force from being used.

Witnesses

testified that defendant appeared to be the aggressor (T. 272)
and that there was no need to stab the boy (T. 183-184).
The evidence is sufficient to support the jury's
finding that defendant was not acting in self-defense but was
acting with the culpable mental state necessary to convict him of
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second-degree murder•

The jury acts as the sole judge of the

witnesses1 credibility and need not accept defendant's selfserving explanations.

State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985).

Thus, the jury's verdict should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
this Court to affirm the conviction and sentence of the lower
court.
DATED this /#^( day of March, 1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

C^

Assistant Attorney General
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